

# Cyber Security R&D: A Personal Perspective

Ravi Sandhu  
Executive Director

Professor of Computer Science  
Lutcher Brown Chair in Cyber Security

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ravi.sandhu@utsa.edu  
www.ics.utsa.edu  
www.profsandhu.com

## MISSION

**Excellence in graduate-level sponsored research**

### PAST SYNOPSIS

- Founded: 2007
- PhDs graduated: 25
- External funding raised: \$22M

### CURRENT STATUS

- Faculty affiliates: 20
  - ❖ College of Sciences: 8, Engineering: 5, Business: 5, Education: 2
  - ❖ Includes 6 with research fully managed through ICS
- Current PhD students: 32
  - ❖ College of Sciences: 22, Engineering: 7, Business: 2, Education: 1
  - ❖ Domestic: 17
  - ❖ Foreign: 15
- Current non-PhD students: 8
  - ❖ Domestic: 7
  - ❖ Foreign: 1

**Objectives**

POLICY

ATTACKS

Enable  
↕  
Enforce

What?

Why?

Respond  
↕  
Defend

**Mechanisms**

P  
R  
O  
T  
E  
C  
T

How?




Complement


D  
E  
T  
E  
C  
T

**Requires**

**Institute Level Effort  
World Class Laboratories  
Global Collaborative Connections**




**Goal: Broaden and Deepen**




**INTEGRITY**  
modification

**AVAILABILITY**  
access



**CONFIDENTIALITY**  
disclosure









**Cannot have it all  
Need to reconcile  
with non-Security Objectives**




**Cost**



**Convenience**



**Growth**



**Safety**

➤ Enable system designers and operators to say:  
This system is secure

Not attainable

➤ Enable system designers and operators to say:  
This system is as secure as it needs to be  
and no more

Many successful examples

“My dear, here we must run as fast as we can, just to stay in place. And if you wish to go anywhere you must run twice as fast as that.”

— Lewis Carroll, Alice in Wonderland





**Single enterprise**

**Multiple interacting parties**

**Cyber only**

**Cyber physical**

**Configured**

**Automated**

**Static**

**Adaptive**

**Experts**

**Naïve users**

**Fractured**

**Seamless**

**Symmetric Key Cryptography, 1977**




**Asymmetric Key Cryptography, 1996**



**Blockchain Applications, ????**

**Discretionary Access Control  
(DAC), 1970**

**Mandatory Access Control (MAC),  
1970**




**Role Based Access Control  
(RBAC), 1995**



**Attribute Based Access Control  
(ABAC), ????**

- Core concept:  
Custodian of information determines access
- Core drawback:  
Does not protect copies  
Therefore OK for integrity but not for confidentiality





- Core concept:
  - Extend control to copies by means of security labels
- Core drawback:
  - Covert channels can make copies that bypass this control

**Discretionary Access Control  
(DAC), 1970**

**Mandatory Access Control (MAC),  
1970**




**Role Based Access Control  
(RBAC), 1995**



**Attribute Based Access Control  
(ABAC), ????**

**Primary-Care  
Physician**

**Specialist  
Physician**



**Physician**



**Health-Care Provider**

- Core concept:  
Roles determine everything
- Core drawback:  
Roles are a natural concept for human users  
But not so natural for:  
Information objects  
IoT things  
Contextual attributes

- Fundamental theorem of RBAC:
  - RBAC can be configured to do DAC
  - RBAC can be configured to do MAC

**Discretionary Access Control  
(DAC), 1970**


**Mandatory Access Control (MAC),  
1970**



**Role Based Access Control  
(RBAC), 1995**



**Attribute Based Access Control  
(ABAC), ????**



- Core concept:  
Attributes determine everything
- Core drawback:  
Flexibility at the cost of complexity  
No fixed access decision rule



**Discretionary Access Control  
(DAC), 1970**


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


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
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**Goal: Broaden and Deepen**


**User and Administrator Interaction**



**User Direct Interaction**

a) Access Control Oriented (ACO) Architecture

**User and Administrator Interaction**



**User Direct Interaction**

b) Enhanced ACO (E-ACO) Architecture

